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ISSUES PRESENTED 
Whether the lower court erred in not finding the 
actions of Midvale City arbitrary and capricious in re-
voking permanently the business license of appellant 
according to the facts presented. 
1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. This is an appeal of a 
denial of a petition for an Extraordinary Writ pursuant to 
Rule 65(B). Appellant's license to sell beer was permanently 
revoked by the Midvale City Council after a finding that an 
employee of appellant had allowed minors in a tavern. 
B. Proceedings and Disposition Below. On the 26th 
day of June, 1984, a hearing was held before the Midvale City 
Council, pursuant to an Order to Show Cause. Evidence was 
heard and appellant, through counsel, produced witnesses, 
testified himself, and cross examined the city's witnesses. 
On the 11th day of July the City entered an order, accompanied 
by Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, permanently re-
voking appellant's Class "C" beer license. On that day an 
amended petition for Extraordinary Writ was filed in the 
Third Judicial District Court, appealing the decision. (The 
original petition was amended to reflect the fact that the 
City had filed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and an 
Order. The original petition was filed before the findings 
were made because of the threat of criminal prosecution by 
the City, communicated to appellant through counsel, should 
he remain open for business, in spite of the absence of 
formal findings.) 
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A p p e l l a n t f i l e d an a f f i d a v i t r e f l e c t i n g h i s f i n a n c i a l 
:*-•;*-, ^ u - i n e s ' - -;-d d i i e ^ ' ; *" * v- ' * i md l ""n-ai.au i e 
.ictTui A/OUIJ : <, -<-_ ... i t e m p o r a r y r e j r . ; m g ^. ; e r was 
? r a n ^ e ' Juda,e Conder e r a n t p d rh*. r e s t r a i n i n g o r d e r , wh ich 
p e n d e n c y * ne a c t i o n . 
!>
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of t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s s u r r o u n d i n g t h e f i r s t i n c i d e n t (See 
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testimony of Junne Charon, City Council hearing pp. ), 
no action was taken by appellant against Ms. Charon. Immed-
iately upon the occurrence of the second incident, Ms. Charon 
was fired (Ibid, p ). 
The fact of the violations was not contested at the 
hearing before the City Council. Appellant testified that 
upon hiring employees he sat down with them and informed them 
of work rules regarding identification, gambling, and serving 
beer. (See testimony of Dave Rivas, city council hearing 
pp. ). This was confirmed by Junne Charon (pp ) 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE 
RESPONDENT'S ACTIONS WERE ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS. 
A. THE FAILURE OF THE RESPONDENT TO MAKE FINDINGS 
WITH RESPECT TO UNDISPUTED TESTIMONY OFFERED BY 
APPELLANT IS ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS. 
Due process naturally requires that the licensee be 
entitled to notice and a hearing, and appellant should be 
afforded the opportunity to present evidence, which he did. 
Additionally, a record must be made so that judicial review is 
possible. Peatross v. Board of Commissioners of Salt Lake 
County, Utah, 555 P.2d 281 (1976). This review is especially 
important since a city council is not law-trained and quasi-
judicial functions are the exception rather than the rule in 
municipal functions. 
Taking the foregoing as true, it certainly follows 
that the hearing must be a meaningful one in the sense that 
all testimony adduced must at least be considered by the 
governing body. And if testimony is undisputed, and relevant, 
as is certainly the case with respect to the referred to test-
imony by Mr. Rivas and Ms. Charon, the Findings of Fact must at 
least recite those facts which are undisputed and relevant. 
Certainly if findings are necessary (Anderson v. Utah County 
Board of County Commissioners, Utah 589 P.2d 1214 (Utah 1979), 
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then to give this requirement meaning, the findings must 
comport with the evidence. 
The findings in this case completely ignore the un-
disputed, relevant testimony of the appellant's witnesses and 
merely recite the allegations contained in the Order to Show 
Cause in conclusory fashion. Where the inferior tribunal 
below ignored these facts, this court should find such action 
to be arbitrary and capricious. 
B. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT 
RESPONDENT ACTED ARBITRARILY AND CAPRICIOUSLY 
IN MAKING NO FINDINGS CONCERNING APPELLANT'S 
PROPERTY INTEREST. 
In the hearing before the City Council, appellant, 
Rivas testified concerning his ownership of the business 
known as Carol's Lounge, the length of such ownership and the 
efforts he had made to comply himself, and assure that his 
employees comply with applicable ordinances and statutes 
concerning his business. In the petition filed in Third 
District Court, appellant executed an affidavit specifying his 
monetary interest in the business. Yet neither in the findings 
before the council, nor the findings in Third District Court 
is there any showing that the appellant's property interest was 
considered. This court has held that 
A city has broad discretion in granting, 
denying or revoking beer licenses, but a 
business enterprise may not be deprived of 
a license without due concern for the 
property interest involved. Anderson v. 
Utah Board of County Commissioners , 589~~ 
P72d m^TCUtah 1979): 
Obviously where this matter is not addressed by 
either the tribunal or the lower court it cannot be said that 
the matter was given ,fdue concern". And if due concern was 
not given to the issue by respondent, its actions were 
arbitrary and capricious, 
C. THE PENALTY OF PERMANENT REVOCATION OF 
APPELLANT'S LICENSE IS, IN AND OF ITSELF, 
ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS AND AN ABUSE OF 
DISCRETION. 
There is no question that cities have broad authority 
in regulating licensees. Whiting vs. Clayton, 617 P.2d 362 
(Utah 1980). This discretion is not unbridled however. As 
has been pointed out, the respondent must take into account the 
property interest one has in his business. If that is so it 
seems to follow that the tribunal must balance that substantial 
interest, and the penalty that a forfeiture would entail, 
against the severity of the violation and the culpability of the 
appellant. Said in another way, to give effect to this court's 
pronouncements, the punishment should fit the crime. 
In this particular case the appellant's testified as to 
the inadvertent nature of the violations, the habit or custom 
with respect to normal enforcement procedures, and the unique 
circumstances surrounding the violations. It should be noted 
that in this area, bar operators like the appellant are required 
to play an enforcement role with respect to city ordinances. 
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They are dealing with an area that involves others who may be 
intent on breaking the law themselves. In such circumstances 
the tribunal should be extremely reluctant to take away 
someones livelihood on a permanent basis, absent flagrant 
violations. 
CONCLUSION 
The tribunal below clearly abused its discretion and 
acted arbitrarily and capriciously by permanently revoking 
appellant's license and hence destroying his livelihood, based 
upon the record below. The respondent failed to make findings 
concerning relevant, undisputed testimony adduced before it. 
Respondent failed to even acknowledge, let alone show Mdue 
concern" for the property interest of appellant, contrary to 
this court's rulings in Whiting and Anderson. The lower court 
erred in denying the petition for extraordinary writ. The 
lower court's order should be reversed and the Respondent's 
order of revocation should be vacated. 
Respectfully submitted 
MARK A. BESENDORFER 
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